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Abstract Among others, the term ‘‘problem’’ plays a major role in the various
attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synony-
mously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity (ID) is regarded as ‘‘problem solving among
science, technology and society’’ and as ‘‘problem orientation beyond disciplinary
constraints’’ (cf. Frodeman et al.: The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). The point of departure of this paper is that
the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the ‘‘problem’’. The objective
here is to shed some light on the vague notion of ‘‘problem’’ in order to advocate a
speciﬁc type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline
is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID
does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of
science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the
umbrella term ‘‘problem-oriented ID’’: object-oriented ID (‘‘ontology’’), theory-
oriented ID (epistemology), and method-oriented ID (methodology). Different
philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I
will then clarify the notion of ‘‘problem’’ by looking at three systematic elements: an
undesired (initial) state, a desired (goal) state, and the barriers in getting from the one
to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems,
target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological
and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that
problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID.
Zusammenfassung Der Begriff des ‘‘Problems’’ spielt eine zentrale Rolle in den
aktuellen Bemu ¨hungen, interdisziplina ¨re Forschung bzw. Interdisziplinarita ¨tz u
kennzeichnen. Interdisziplinarita ¨t (ID) wird als ‘‘Problemlo ¨sen an der Schnittstelle
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Methodenzwang’’ angesehen (vgl. Frodeman et al.: The Oxford Handbook of
Interdisciplinarity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). Doch die semantisch
unbestimmte Redeweise von ‘‘Problem’’ ist alles andere als unproblematisch.—Der
Ausgangspunkt dieses Papiers liegt in einer Deﬁzitdiagnose, na ¨mlich dass Diskurs
und Praxis interdisziplina ¨rer Forschung Probleme mit den Problemen haben. Ziel
der folgenden Ausfu ¨hrungen ist es, hier gegenzusteuern und den vagen Begriff des
‘‘Problems’’ kritisch zu beleuchten. Damit kann ein speziﬁscher Typ der ID positiv
ausgezeichnet werden: die Problem-orientierte ID.—Zur Agenda: Zuna ¨chst wird
unter Ru ¨ckgriff auf etablierte Unterscheidungen der Wissenschaftsphilosophie eine
Abgrenzung vorgenommen und gezeigt, was Problem-orientierte ID nicht meint:
Objekt-orientierte ID (‘‘Ontologie’’), Theorie-orientierte ID (Epistemologie) und
Methoden-orientierte ID (Methodologie). Unterschiedliche Denktraditionen stehen
fu ¨r diese verschiedenen ID-Typen Pate. Sodann wird im Hauptteil des Papiers der
Begriff des Problems untersucht. Drei notwendige Bedingungen kennzeichnen
diesen in formaler Hinsicht: ein unerwu ¨nschter (Anfangs-)Zustand, ein erwu ¨nschter
(End-) Zustand sowie eine Barriere, von dem einen in den anderen Zustand zu
gelangen. Diese drei Elemente umfassen drei Wissenstypen: System-, Ziel- und
Transformations-Wissen. Das Papier zeigt weitere methodologische und episte-
mologische Aspekte der Problem-orientierten ID auf. Schließlich werden Bedarf
und Herausforderungen an Problem-orientierter ID herausgestellt.
Re ´sume ´ Entre autres, le terme «proble `me» joue un ro ˆle majeur dans les diffe ´-
rentes tentatives de caracte ´riser l’interdisciplinarite ´ (ou transdisciplinarite ´, utilise ´ de
manie `re synonyme dans cette e ´tude). L’interdisciplinarite ´ (ID) est de ´ﬁnie comme
«la re ´solution des proble `mes entre la science, la technologie et la socie ´te ´» ainsi que
«l’orientation des proble `mes en-dehors des limites disciplinaires» (cf. Frodeman
et al.: The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2010). Le point de de ´part de cette e ´tude est d’e ´claircir la notion vague du
«proble `me» aﬁn de recommander un genre spe ´ciﬁque d’interdisciplinarite ´: l’inter-
disciplinarite ´ axe ´e sur le proble `me. Avec une approche ex negativo je vais alors
montrer ce que l’interdisciplinarite ´ ne veut pas dire. En utilisant des re ´fe ´rences a ` des
distinctions bien connues du monde de la philosophie de la science, je montrerai
trois autres types d’ID qui ne devraient pas e ˆtre place ´es sous le terme universel de
«l’interdisciplinarite ´ axe ´e sur le proble `me»: l’interdisciplinarite ´ axe ´e sur l’objet
(ontologie), l’interdisciplinarite ´ axe ´e sur la the ´orie (e ´piste ´mologie), et l’interdisci-
plinarite ´ axe ´e sur la me ´thode (me ´thodologie). Diffe ´rentes traditions de la philoso-
phie peuvent e ˆtre lie ´es a ` ces sens reconnaissables. J’e ´claircirai la notion du
«proble `me» en examinant trois e ´le ´ments syste ´matiques: l’e ´tat non-de ´sire ´ initial,
l’e ´tat ﬁnal de ´sire ´, les barrie `res qui existent entre l’e ´tat initial et l’e ´tat ﬁnal. Ces trois
e ´le ´ments contiennent trois genres de connaissance lie ´s: les connaissances des
syste `mes, de la cible et de la transformation. Cette e ´tude conclut en soulignant que
c’est de l’interdisciplinarite ´ axe ´e sur le proble `me que le plus grand besoin existe;
c’est e ´galement ce genre d’interdisciplinarite ´ qui pre ´sente le plus grand de ´ﬁ.
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1231 On the problems with the problems …
In the wake of the discourse on interdisciplinarity, the notion of ‘‘problem’’ plays a
key role. Interdisciplinarity is considered a ‘‘problem-orientation beyond disciplin-
ary boundaries’’. However, the reference to the buzz word ‘‘problem’’ is not very
speciﬁc. Problems can also be found in traditional disciplinary sciences as well as in
the life world. Karl Popper stresses that ‘‘we study not disciplines, but problems.
Often, problems transcend the boundaries of a particular discipline’’ (Popper 2000:
97). In consequence, there does not seem to be any differentia speciﬁca between
interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity or between interdisciplinarity and day-to-day
action. Problems seem to be everywhere and nowhere!
In spite of the lack of distinction, Thompson Klein et al. (2001) characterize
interdisciplinary research by its reference to problems: interdisciplinarity is ‘‘joint
problem solving among science, technology, and society’’. In the same vein, Ju ¨rgen
Mittelstraß stresses that ‘‘by ‘transdisciplinarity’ we describe types of research and
sciences that transcend disciplinary orientation in a problem-oriented manner’’
(Mittelstraß 1998: 44). Hartmut von Hentig regards interdisciplinarity as a reﬂexive
term: ‘‘interdisciplinarity reminds us that the departmental structure of universities
restricts them to fulﬁlling the real tasks that are posed by the world to the science
system’’ (Hentig 1972: 19). Similarly, Jochen Jaeger and Martin Scheringer argue in
favor of a ‘‘problem-related form of science’’: ‘‘Problem-orientation without method
constraints’’ (Jaeger and Scheringer 1998). Egon Becker and Thomas Jahn
conceptualize Social Ecology as a research program in which the ‘‘challenging
problems are not simply given via the disciplines, but are deeply rooted in societal
practice’’ (Becker and Jahn 2006: 310). Gotthard Bechmann situates ‘‘problem-
oriented research in between public policy and science’’; he draws attention in
particular to Technology Assessment (TA) (Bechmann and Frederichs 1996).
According to Michael Decker, TA is in its origin interdisciplinary research that
‘‘identiﬁes and works on trans-scientiﬁc problems’’ that are ‘‘political or societal
problems’’ (Decker 2010: 145). Carl Friedrich Gethmann formulates requirements
on TA: ‘‘Any kind of rational judgment of the consequences of science and
technology has to provide suggestions on how to solve transdisciplinary problems’’
(Gethmann 1999: 4). Gu ¨nter Ropohl advocates a concept for a Synthetic Philosophy
that is based on his General System Theory wherein problems constitute the very
core: ‘‘Transdisciplinary sciences deﬁne their problems with regard to life-world
relevance’’ (Ropohl 2005: 29; cf. Ropohl 2002). Armin Grunwald seeks quality
criteria to specify the added-value of ‘‘problem-oriented research’’; he points to
relevance decisions before or at the beginning of problem-oriented research
projects:
1 The problem-framing process is based on normative relevance decisions
(Grunwald 2002). However, is the common parlance about problems self-evident?
Not at all! The notion of problem remains as unclear as the term ‘‘interdisci-
plinarity’’—although great efforts have been made in pre-projects at the TA ofﬁce
1 ‘‘In the early stages of projects involving integrative research one comes to an agreement on which
areas of inquiry and issues are relevant for the purpose in question and its context. It is not an
exaggeration to say that such prior decisions are among the major challenges of problem-oriented
research’’ (Grunwald 2004: 10) (my translation, J.C.S.).
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123of the German Bundestag (TAB), at the Europa ¨ische Akademie Bad Neuenahr-
Ahrweiler or at the Institute of Social-Ecological Research (ISOE). Karl Popper’s
point—Life always is problem solving!—highlights the under-determination of the
notion of problem. It seems that everywhere in our life world and in disciplinary
sciences problems are being identiﬁed, framed, worked on, and solved: physics,
biology, or sociology appears to be problem oriented or, more than this, problem
determined. If this broad understanding was prevalent, there would not be any
differentia speciﬁca.
The objective of this paper is to foster and facilitate the theory discourse on
interdisciplinarity, and in particular a conceptual foundation of problem-oriented
interdisciplinarity by ﬁnding a demarcation line between this type of interdisci-
plinarity and other types. In the following, I will try to contribute to a clariﬁcation of
both terms—‘‘problem’’ and ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. With reference to well-estab-
lished differences within the philosophy of science, a plurality of four different
dimensions will be proposed: interdisciplinarity with regard to objects (‘‘ontol-
ogy’’), knowledge/theories (epistemology), methods/practices (methodology), and
problems.
2 What problem-oriented interdisciplinarity is not …
The discourse on interdisciplinarity (ID) is normative and, to some extent,
appellative. It starts with an uneasiness, disappointment, and criticism. The
advocates of ID identify deﬁcits within the science system or, more generally, in
academia and the sciences themselves (cf. Mittelstraß 1987). They call fundamental
assumptions into question: academic status quo, research objectives, education
processes, rationality, methodology.
2 Almost all who mention ‘‘ID’’ are pursuing
goals, e.g., to solve pressing societal problems, advance academic knowledge, unify
cognitive life worlds, and ensure economic growth. Describing science from an
unattached observer’s perspective is not their aim. Rather, they intend to change,
renew and restructure sciences, research and development, or society at large. ID is
therefore a means and a medium, not an end in itself. Speaking of ID, Jantsch (1972)
proposes a ‘‘self-renewal’’ of academia and the university system, entailing a change
of society at large. Today, the revolutionary attitude is being deconstructed.
Fagerberg (2005: 8) regards ID as the source of ‘‘innovation and long-term
economic growth’’. In all approaches, normativity is involved. An implicit societal
theory—how are contemporary technoscientiﬁc societies to be understood and how
should the societal future be shaped—is always present when the buzzword ‘‘ID’’
appears. ID is an eminently political term (cf. Frodeman et al. 2010; Weingart and
Stehr 2000).
Two assumptions are most prominent: The boundary premise presupposes a
dichotomy or, at least, a separation between disciplines or between academia and
society; the transgression premise assumes that options for overcoming boundaries
2 According to Adorno (1969: 158), ‘‘critique of knowledge is critique of society, and v.v.’’. Latour
(1998: 4) argues that epistemology and politics ‘‘go hand in hand’’.
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123do exist: transfer, integration, uniﬁcation (cf. Thompson Klein 1996). ID obviously
gives rise to a boundary paradox: elimination and conservation of boundaries at the
same time. If ‘‘elimination’’ was to succeed, ID would dissolve. Instead of boundary
paradox, a more appropriate term would seem to be boundary dialectic, which is
similar to Hegel’s ‘Aufhebung’. A twofold requirement on a philosophical reﬂection
of ID is to provide a concept of both, separation and integration. By considering
boundaries, the one-sided position of ID-integrationists, uniﬁcationists, and
reductionists can be rejected. The boundary theme is an old topic of philosophy,
intrinsically interlaced with monism, dualism and pluralism, and with reductionism
and non-reductionism. Over the last 30 years, prominent philosophers and social
scientists have studied boundaries—but not explicitly the notion of ID (e.g. Star/
Griesemer/Lowy; Beck; Luhmann; Parsons; Latour; Haraway; Bauman; Foucault;
Serres).
3
Against this background—the twofold requirement of ‘‘ID’’: separation and
integration—we will now consider four types of ID and thereby draw a distinction
between problem-oriented ID and other types. We will employ the well-established
distinction between objects/reality (‘‘ontology’’), knowledge/theories (epistemol-
ogy), and methods/practices (methodology) (cf. Schmidt 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007a,
2010; Jungert et al. 2010; Kline 1995).
When we speak of ‘‘problem-oriented ID,’’ we do not refer to an object-oriented
type of ID. ‘‘Interdisciplinarity’’ may refer to objects or entities (‘‘ontological’’ type;
object-oriented ID). The historically established functional differentiation of
scientiﬁc disciplines does not seem to be totally contingent. Rather, it mirrors
aspects of the structure of reality itself. Edmund Husserl, Nicolai Hartmann, Alfred
North Whitehead, and others have favored a structurally layered concept of reality.
Boundaries between the micro-, meso-, and macro-cosm seem to be evident.
Interdisciplinary objects are thought to be located or constructed within the structure
of reality. They lie on the boundaries between different micro-, meso-, macro-, and
other cosms or within the border zones between disciplines; examples are as
follows: brain-mind objects, nanoobjects, or the hole in the ozone layer. In order to
advocate this position, one has to presuppose an ontological realism, or at least a
3 I should be explicit and state that I will not follow the one-sided unity view of interdisciplinarity. For
instance, Julie Thompson Klein argues that ‘‘the modern concept of interdisciplinarity has been shaped in
[…] major ways, [in particular] by attempts to retain and, in many cases, reinstall historical ideas of
unity’’. ‘‘The roots of the concepts lie in a number of ideas that resonate throughout the discourse—the
ideas of a uniﬁed science, general knowledge, synthesis, and the integration of knowledge’’. In addition,
throughout this paper unity is regarded just as one deﬁning element—one that has to be clariﬁed. Other,
obviously contrary elements refer, for instance, to non-reductionism and pluralism. Indeed, some
interdisciplinarians advocate unity and reductionism, others pluralism and non-reductionism. Thus,
interdisciplinarity should be regarded as a relational term that carries an indissoluble tension between
unity and plurality, between reducibility and irreducibility, and between reductionism and antireduc-
tionism. My main argument against the advocates of unity is that ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ would be
meaningless and powerless if it just aimed to reinstall unity and to enable more reductions. If this were the
case, physics would be the most successful way to practice interdisciplinarity. Further, it is even more
paradoxical that, should interdisciplinarity ﬁnally win through, unity would be reached and, at the same
time, interdisciplinarity would dissolve. Because of these intrinsic problems my position differs from the
unity view. I therefore present my proposal for a plural framework for understanding
‘‘interdisciplinarity’’.
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123real-constructivism
4 concerning the objects, interlaced with a layered concept of
reality, and, based on this, an ontological non-reductionism.
5 Old and ongoing
issues about ontological monism, dualism, and pluralism emerge in this debate.
‘‘ID’’ here does not mainly refer to knowledge, methods, or problems, but to an
external, human-independent reality. Some weaker versions of this position do not
claim the timeless (‘‘Platonist’’) existence of ‘‘interdisciplinary’’ objects. The future
development of science may shift these objects to domains of new disciplines or, on
the other hand, it may be shown that they belong to ﬁelds of classical, already
existing disciplines. Or, one may consider interdisciplinary objects to be created by
the extended use of technologies (‘‘real-constructivism’’ or ‘‘materialistic construc-
tivism’’) or cognitively constructed by sciences themselves (classical ‘‘cognitive
constructivism’’, ‘‘idealistic constructivism’’), for instance, the hole in the ozone
layer, nanobots, or some of the virtual objects which are nowadays the objects of
inquiry of the computer sciences.
6 Donna Haraway’s hybrids, Bruno Latour’s quasi-
objects, Susan Leigh Star’s boundary objects, Davis Baird’s things, und Alfred
Nordmann’s technoscientiﬁc objects can be regarded as real-constructed interdis-
ciplinary objects.
7
Problem-oriented ID obviously does not refer to theories or concepts, i.e. to
interdisciplinary theories (epistemological type of ID). If we want to talk about
theory-oriented ID, the pertinent question is: Can any particular type of knowledge,
recognition or scientiﬁc truth be called ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’? Can we demarcate
interdisciplinary knowledge from disciplinary knowledge or from non-scientiﬁc
knowledge? Is there a unique context of justiﬁcation of interdisciplinary theories?
Do interdisciplinary models, laws, explications, descriptions, and explanations
exist? Possible ID concepts are meta-theories, which can be applied to describe very
different disciplinary objects. According to this view, an interdisciplinary theory
highlights structural similarities between certain properties of objects from various
disciplines. Such a theory is not reducible to a disciplinary one—that is,
interdisciplinary theories do not ﬁt in the disciplinary framework. Epistemological
non-reductionism with regard to disciplinary theories is the most compelling
4 The position of real-constructivism is not fully developed in the philosophy of science, although the
‘‘new experientalism’’ has broadly argued in favor of it. This position traces back to Francis Bacon in the
early 17th century. Also, some aspects can be found in the pragmatist tradition. Today Hacking (1983),
Latour and Woolgar (1979) support this position.
5 Ontological reductionism is known as the stance stating that the world consists (totally) of atoms or
other fundamental material entities (‘‘materialism’’) or, on the contrary, of mental entities (‘‘idealism’’).
6 They have not existed since the beginning of the world. It might be disputed whether these objects are
by themselves ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ or, on the other hand, whether they are just perceived, described, or
shaped from an interdisciplinarity perspective. Although it might be controversial whether a particular
object is to be labeled ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’—for instance, a technical object may be seen as a disciplinary
object of engineering sciences or as an interdisciplinarity object—,interdisciplinarity objects seem to exist
at least for a certain time.
7 A similar line of thought is found in an extensive study by Bergmann et al. (2010: 106) in which the
concept of transdisciplinary ‘‘integration through boundary objects’’ is introduced. ‘‘Without an
identiﬁcation [or even construction] of Boundary Objects, mutual work cannot begin, let alone be
organized’’ (Bergmann et al. 2010: 106). More speciﬁcally, according to the study, ‘‘materialization is
also the basis for the integrative effect of artifacts. One could describe them as integrative interfaces that
have become material’’ (ibid.).
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123position. The so-called structural sciences such as complex systems theory are
prominent examples of meta-theories. The goal is a cognitive integration and
theoretical synthesis of knowledge. Similar to complex systems theory are theories
such as self-organization theory, dissipative structures, synergetics, chaos theory,
non-linear dynamics, fractal geometry, and catastrophe theory. Most of these
theories were established in the late 1960s and early 1970s, although some
foundational work dates back to the late 19th century (cf. Mainzer 1996; Schmidt
2008). Hermann Haken, the founder of synergetics in the 1960s, regards synergetics
as an ‘‘interdisciplinary theory of general interactions’’ (Haken 1980). In fact, this
type of ID, which might be characterized as meta-disciplinary—or at least non-
disciplinary—abstract knowledge, is not new. Fundamental ideas can be found in
works from the 1940s and 1950s. The physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von
Weizsa ¨cker coined the term ‘‘structural sciences’’ (Weizsa ¨cker 1974: 22).
Weizsa ¨cker writes that structural sciences ‘‘study their objects regardless of
disciplinary origin and in abstraction from disciplinary allocation’’. Today, complex
systems theory describes process phenomena—such as pattern formation, self-
organization, critical behavior, bifurcations, phase transitions, structure breaking,
and catastrophes—in different disciplinary branches.
Moreover, the speciﬁcation of problem-oriented ID does not so much take into
account method-oriented ID or interdisciplinary methods (methodological type)—
even though this dimension does play a role. Jochen Jaeger and Martin Scheringer
conceptualize problem-oriented ID as ‘‘research without disciplinary constraints in
methods’’ (Jaeger and Scheringer 1998; cf. Mittelstraß 2005). The central issue with
regard to designating a method-oriented ID is whether there are special canons or
methods, rules, empirical settings, and hermeneutic forms which typify ID and
positively determine it. One basic question regarding methodology is how we can
attain knowledge and insight. Rough classical categorisations distinguish between
empirical and hermeneutic, nomothetic and ideographic, explaining and under-
standing methods as well as those of the natural sciences and the humanities (cf.
Rickert 1986).
8 As regards ID, central questions are as follows: Do interdisciplinary
methods and actions exist? Is there a speciﬁc context of discovery? Interdisciplinary
methodologies are thought to be irreducible to a disciplinary methodology.
9
Biomimicry/biomimetics—sometimes used interchangeably with ‘‘bionics’’—is an
excellent example of an interdisciplinary method (Benyus 2002; Rossmann and
Tropea 2005). At the core of the biomimicry methodology is the cross-fertilization
between two disciplines: biology and engineering sciences. Biomimicry claims to
be a ‘‘transfer methodology’’ from biology to engineering sciences, and probably—
which is mostly not acknowledged—vice versa. The central, popular, and of course
questionable idea of biomimicry can be summarized as follows: ‘‘learning from
8 In his work ‘‘Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft’’, H. Rickert writes in the introduction to the
20th century boundary: ‘‘There is mostly agreement today that the specialist sciences fall into two
categories […] which are interconnected by common interest’’ (Rickert 1986: 1). Rickert continues with
his well-known dichotomy of nomothetic versus ideographic.
9 In other branches it is clear that hermeneutics is not reducible to empirical measurement and
quantitative objectivity; empirical measurement and data analysis methodologies are not reducible to
hermeneutics (cf. Rickert 1986).
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123Nature’’ in order to ‘‘inspire technological innovations’’ and to develop efﬁcient
artifacts and processes (cf. Benyus 2002). Nature seems to provide excellent ideas and
inventions that can be used to construct technology.
10 However, interdisciplinary
translations are based on models. ‘‘Learning from Nature’’ therefore means learning
from models of Nature. What we call ‘‘Nature’’ is not a given but is constructed.
Immanuel Kant argued that we have to be aware that Nature is perceived and
cognitively constructed from the perspective of technology; biomimicry constructs
models of biological nature from the perspective of engineering sciences. Thus, the
transfer method is not a one-way street. A robot, for example, mimics an ant, but at the
same time the ant has been investigated and described from a technological
perspective.
11 Besides biomimicry, there are other examples of interdisciplinary
methodologies.Econophysicsissimilartobiomimicry.Itmethodologicallyorganizesa
transfer between physics and ﬁnance/economics (Mantegna and Stanley 2000;
McCauley 2004). In addition to these transfer methodologies, a new kind of non-
disciplinary methodology of knowledge production has emerged over the past
50 years:mathematicalmodelingandcomputer-basedsimulations.Modelingtoolsand
simulationtechniquesarenotonlyappliedinvariousdisciplines—forinstance,inorder
to reduce the costs of experimentation or to improve the prediction accuracy. They are
also used and developed pragmatically to integrate knowledge from different
disciplinary domains (cf. Nersessian 2008). Special kinds of integrative methodologies
have been developed in the realm of Technology Assessment, Social-Ecological
Research, and Sustainability Research. However, the integration methodologies are
still an ongoing challenge throughout this ﬁeld—in particular, when integrating
descriptive, normative, and abductive forms of knowledge is involved.
3 What problem-oriented interdisciplinarity is …
It is striking that the three types of ID elaborated above do not cover the whole
breadth of the notions of ID that are present throughout the recent discourse. We,
therefore, have to add another type that does justice to the discourse. It is
frequently stressed that the world has problems and the academic world has
departments and disciplines. In other words, the world’s problems and the
academic world, in particular the university system, are incommensurable. The
incommensurability thesis is the point of departure of those who advocate another
type of ID. It is sometimes called ‘‘transdisciplinarity’’, with emphasis on ‘‘joint
problem solving among science, technology, and society’’ in order to ‘‘manage
complexity’’ (Thompson Klein et al. 2001).
This type of ID focuses on the starting points, goals, and purposes of
interdisciplinary research activities—in other words, on the constitution, identiﬁ-
cation, and framing of problems. Problems make this type of ID necessary and
10 As far as the protagonists of biomimicry are concerned, ‘‘nature reaches its goals efﬁciently and
economically, with a minimum of available energy and resources’’ (ibid.).
11 Construction and reconstruction, intervention and representation, here: technology/engineering science
and biology are merged. Biomimicry does not aim to produce only knowledge but to produce technical
artifacts. Analogies play an important methodological role.
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123indispensable. Throughout the discourse on ID, it seems to be a widespread position
that ‘‘problem-oriented research has to be interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary in its
very core’’ (Bechmann and Frederichs 1996: 17; cf. Ropohl 2002; Bogner et al.
2010). Although the reference to challenging, complex real-world problems and the
call for ID is popular today, it has its own history (Thompson Klein 1990). In an
epochal-breaking approach, Alvin Weinberg was the ﬁrst to suggest the term
‘‘problem’’ in the context of research for society (Weinberg 1972). Weinberg speaks
of ‘‘big problems’’, such as challenging and pressing questions of national security,
the future of the social welfare system, the science policy of research and
development programs, and environmental problems. Weinberg’s still-relevant
diagnosis was the following: The science system does not have any answers to
pressing societal questions. In order to overcome the deﬁcits, Weinberg developed
the concept of ‘‘trans-science’’ (Weinberg 1972).
12 In line with this approach, Erich
Jantsch proposed a ‘‘purposive understanding of ID’’ and a ‘‘purpose-oriented ID’’:
An explicit reﬂection on and revision of purposes should be regarded as the highest
level of ID that Jantsch called ‘‘transdisciplinarity’’ (Jantsch 1972: 100f).
13
Interdisciplinary problems are regarded as being external to disciplines or to
academia. They are primarily societal ones that are (pre-) deﬁned by society, e.g.,
lay people, politicians, and stakeholders. This approach to the societally relevant
starting point of research activities comes close to today’s science-based enterprises
such as technology assessment (TA), sustainability science, and global chance
science, which can be considered as examples of this type of ID (Decker 2007; Pohl
and Hirsch Hadorn 2006). Problem-oriented ID reﬂects on and revises the problem
perception; the starting points of science and technology programs are at the focus.
This is interlaced with problem-framing and agenda setting (Becker and Jahn 2006;
Schmidt 2007a, b, 2010; Hoffmann 2010; Bergmann et al. 2010; Liebert and
Schmidt 2010b; Krohn 2010).
Because problems precede both the context of discovery and the context of
justiﬁcation—in other words: methods/means and theories/models—problem-
oriented ID is a speciﬁc type of ID that cannot be subsumed under the label of
method-oriented ID or theory-oriented ID. The teleological structure in the process
of knowledge production is most evident but not always acknowledged.
14 The ﬁrst
step in scientiﬁc inquiry—the problem seeing and agenda setting, the volition or
intention to obtain knowledge—is often judged to be a contingent factor. It has been
widely ignored or devaluated by the philosophy of science, although extended work
has been done on problems called ‘‘wicked problems’’ (cf. Norton 2005: 131f/
159f).
15 Philosophical ethics, in particular discourse ethics developed by Apel and
12 The OTA Act of 1972 also contains the notion of problem; it is the intention of the OTA to address
‘‘existing and emerging national problems’’ (OTA 1972).
13 In addition, the approach of Chubin et al. to ‘‘ID’’ by referring to ‘‘theory and practice of problem-
focused research’’ was very inﬂuential on the ID discourse (Chubin et al. 1986).
14 Ju ¨rgen Habermas underscores the interests of the sciences and the purposes interlaced with the
research processes (Habermas 1970).
15 The lack of reﬂection on purposes turns out to be a deﬁcit in specifying this fourth type of ID. The
reﬂection on and revision of purposes was—according to Erich Jantsch in the 1970s—a unique criterion
for demarcating ID from disciplinarity (Jantsch 1972).
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including the perception and framing of problems. As well, concepts of
Rationalist Technology Assessment (RTA, pre-studies, pre-projects) (Grunwald
1999), of Prospective Technology Assessment (ProTA) (Liebert and Schmidt
2010a, b) and of Social-Ecological Research (Becker and Jahn 2006)h a v e
addressed the issue of problems as the starting point of any problem-oriented
interdisciplinary project.
Unfortunately, these efforts did not have a broader inﬂuence on the societal,
scientiﬁc, and philosophical understanding of science. The neglect of the notion of
problem can also be seen as a consequence of the implicit predominance of
analytical philosophy of science.
16 Analytical philosophers of science have always
been reluctant to consider normative aspects within science’s core; they more or less
still parade the value-free view of sciences. Accompanied by the notion of problem,
normativity is nevertheless existent. Framing knowledge production from the angle
of ‘‘problem’’ may contribute to the critique of the self-stylization of science as a
value-free enterprise. Those who talk about problem-oriented ID cannot talk at the
same time about value freeness. Therefore, the notion of problem can be regarded as
a reﬂexive term that calls for an explication of who is considering what as a problem
and why. In fact, problems can be considered as a kind of epistemology-ethics
hybrid that carries a call-to-action: Problems are seen as negative, as indicating a
deﬁcit state that needs to be addressed; problems have to be eliminated.
Although philosophers have not addressed the notion of problem, the word is
present in the works of many prominent philosophers. Karl Popper stresses that a
‘‘good hypothesis has to include risky problems’’, Thomas S. Kuhn believes that a
‘‘paradigm determines the choice of problems’’, Imre Lakatos coins the notion of
‘‘progressive versus degenerating problem shift’’, and Larry Laudan regards
‘‘sciences as problem-solving action’’. Popper underlines that ‘‘we aren’t studying
subjects [= Fa ¨cher], but problems. Problems can transgress the boundaries of a
certain pre-deﬁned domain of a certain scientiﬁc discipline’’ (Popper 2000: 97).
Popper, however, like other prominent philosophers of science does not explicate
the term ‘‘problem’’; it remains vague. Although Kuhn is not more precise than
Popper, he presents an idea that comes close to the recent discourse on problem-
oriented ID. As early as in 1962, Kuhn perceived a professional blindness of
scientists with regard to societal problems: ‘‘A paradigm can isolate the scientiﬁc
community from societally relevant problems that resist being reducible to the form
of a puzzle insofar as such problems cannot be expressed in the terminological and
instrumental means of the paradigm’’ (Kuhn 1996: 51). Kuhn adds: ‘‘The societally
pressing problems, such as ﬁnding a therapy against cancer or concepts for a lasting
state of peace, are certainly not puzzles’’ (ibid.).
Problems are also not to be considered puzzles because they do not have clear
solutions in a way that scientiﬁc puzzles are assumed to have. An implicit
distinction between problems and solutions is present throughout the discourse on
16 The neglect of problems seems to be rooted in a deep kind of self-mythologization of scientists and
(analytical) philosophers of science. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘‘the experimental method gives
substance to the misleading belief that we have the means to cope with the problems that worry us’’. This
is a misperception insofar as ‘‘problems and methods do not match’’ (Wittgenstein 1999: xiv).
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sciences are able to come up with a new artifact to solve a technical problem.
17
Rather, in problem-oriented ID much is achieved when a problem is constituted,
framed, and clariﬁed—in other words: when rational arguments underlining that a
certain situation is a problem are presented. Problem-oriented ID may offer advice
on possible solutions to problems. However, it does not solve the problems itself: It
supports a decision but does not provide the actual decision. The science system
itself, and thus problem-oriented knowledge production, is not legitimized to
recommend any kind of solution; otherwise democratic societies would turn into
expertocraties.
18
4 Formal clariﬁcation: problems
How do we know that X is a problem?
19 Gereon Wolters deﬁnes a problem as the
‘‘incompatibility of some propositions (the ‘problems’) with the set of those
propositions that are considered as true or evident’’ (Wolters 2004: 347). To put it in
other words: A problem is what does not ﬁt the general body of accepted
knowledge; the notion of problem thus emerges as a concept of relations; it is based
on the relation between two or more propositions.
This approach from the narrow angle of philosophy of science with its reference
to incompatibility is a necessary, but insufﬁcient condition to clarify what a
‘‘problem’’ is. Problems call for action; the notion cannot be restricted to
propositions and general cognitive aspects that are traditionally part of philosophy
of science. Therefore, action theory (and philosophy of action) has to complement
the philosophy of science in order to give further substance to the notion of problem.
An integrative approach has been developed from different angles by Dietrich
Do ¨rner and Roland W. Scholz. They combine system theory with action theory,
philosophy of science, and cognitive psychology. Although Do ¨rner does not focus
explicitly on ID, his conception of problems can serve as a framework for the
clariﬁcation of what problem-oriented ID is. According to Do ¨rner, a problem is
based on a relation of three elements that encompass normative and descriptive,
qualitative and quantitative aspects: (1) an undesired (initial) state of the current
situation, including an anticipation of prospective futures; (2) a desired (ﬁnal) state
of how the future should look like; and (3) a barrier, obstacle or hurdle
20 that
17 Not only are purposes and means driving on a roundabout—the same can be said of problems and
solutions.
18 ‘‘A problem’’, Miguel de Unamuno writes in his essay How to make a Novel, ‘‘does not presuppose the
existence of a solution in the sense of an analytical clariﬁcation or resolution of the problem, but rather a
construction or creation. It is resolved within action’’.
19 The term ‘‘problem’’ traces back to Ancient Greece; it means task or issue. Thus, in English usage
today the notion comes much closer to the Greek origin than the German understanding, which is, indeed,
much broader and more general.
20 Becker and Jahn do not use the term barriers, but instead they speak of ‘‘hurdles’’: ‘‘Therein [= in the
systemic theories of emergence] systemic problems are described as hurdles to the reproduction and
evolution of emergent systems’’ (Becker and Jahn 2006: 312).
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desired state (Do ¨rner 1995). Roland W. Scholz takes a similar stance. He goes
beyond Do ¨rner by assigning a pivotal role to each piece of knowledge: Without
language, knowledge, and recognition, we cannot speak of a problem. According to
Scholz, we can speak of a problem if and only if (1) there is a difference or
divergence between (a) a target knowledge that refers to the desired state in the
future (‘‘target state’’) on the one hand and (b) a system knowledge that reﬂects the
current state (‘‘actual situation’’) on the other hand, and (2) the non-existence of an
appropriate transformation knowledge that facilitates the transfer from the actual
situation to the target state. The transformation knowledge encompasses action
knowledge, about how to overcome barriers by certain decisions in order to enable
speciﬁc actions (cf. Scholz 2011).
However, that is not all to be said about the formal aspects of ‘‘problems’’. A
temporal dimension can and should be considered. Problem-oriented ID
contributes to the perception and framing of a situation as a ‘‘problem’’. The
word ‘‘situation’’ can refer to an actual state or, as an extension of Do ¨rner’s and
Scholz’s approach, to a future state. A certain future state may be largely
undesired—a dystopia—and the actual state may be the desired one, for instance
regarding global change effects. In this case, a problem has not yet emerged but
might or will emerge in the future. Although it does not yet exist, an anticipated
problem is considered as ‘‘real’’; it induces a call for action. Problem-oriented ID
is inherently future oriented. It can be regarded as (anticipatory) precautionary
research ex ante: Problems should be hindered from emerging, for example by a
problem radar based on a precautionary principle and supported by methods of
technology assessment.
In summary, problem-oriented ID aims to offer system, target, and transforma-
tion knowledge, including a time-sensitive, temporal dimension, and an ex ante
reﬂection on prospective future states—this is what we call problem knowledge. The
balance and interplay of the three kinds of knowledge will always remain a matter
of dispute that needs agreement in different contexts. It is undisputable that problem
knowledge is intrinsically interlaced with action knowledge.
21 The notion of
problem encompasses thus (i) the assessment of the actual or future state—from the
angle of an anticipated target state—as being undesired or negative (negativity
thesis) and (ii) the barrier to reaching or avoiding the target or anticipated state
(barrier thesis). If an actor does not have what he or she wishes to have or possess,
and if he or she cannot obtain it, the actor has a problem: If we desire to live in a
world without atomic weapons or would like to travel without carbon dioxide
emissions but cannot do so, we are faced with problems. This notion of problem
carries certain elements of action theories, including aspects of ‘‘inhibited
effecting’’ (Wright 1991) and ‘‘thwarted realization of objectives and purposes’’
(Grunwald 2002). All these touch upon philosophical ethics, philosophy of science,
21 Cognate aspects can be found in the works on conceptual elements towards a theory of TA (technology
assessment; cf. Grunwald 2007). TA is characterized by a threefold orientation: consequence, science and
consultancy, which comes close to target, system and transformation knowledge.
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techniques. It can be considered as a major part of system thinking.
22
5 Clariﬁcation of methodological assumptions: boundaries
Throughout the discourse on problem-oriented ID, the assumption of boundaries is
striking and gives rise to the boundary paradox (see above). A clear demarcation is
considered to exist between sciences and society—that is a strong thesis of an
internal/external dichotomy.
23 Insofar as problem-oriented ID aims to transgress the
boundary, it has to assume that it exists: The boundary is a necessary condition for
talking about problem-oriented ID.
24 Problem-oriented ID intends to transgress this
boundary in two ways. It takes up external (to science) societal problems, works on
them internally, and transfers the results to the societal domain in order to contribute
to extra-scientiﬁc societal problem solving. In the 1970s, the underlying thesis of
the internal/external dichotomy was broadly present in the ﬁnalization thesis
advocated by Wolfgang van den Daele, Wolf Krohn, and Gernot Bo ¨hme: In certain
phases of the evolution of sciences, external goals drive internal development.
Based on Kuhn’s terminology, the external goals are driving the pre- and post-
paradigmatic phases (Bo ¨hme et al. 1974, 1978). Similar dichotomies are present in
concepts that emerged later, e.g., the theses of post-normal, post-academic, mode-II,
or techno-sciences (cf. Schmidt 2007a; Kastenhofer 2010).
The kinds of problems addressed by problem-oriented ID are, therefore, not
(i) disciplinary problems internal to science, (ii) problems based on major
(interdisciplinary) objects,
25 (iii) problems at the intersection of different disci-
plines, or (iv) engineering or technical problems (cf. Jaeger and Scheringer 1998:
11f/18). For these kinds of problems, the borderline between science and society is
irrelevant. Conversely, the boundary assumption is indispensable for the notion of
problem-oriented ID; the borderline needs to be transgressed. Therefore, problem-
oriented ID can be regarded as a translation or circulation science—from external to
internal and subsequently from internal to external. The problem (external to
science) has to be translated in order to constitute a scientiﬁc object. According
to John Dewey, the constitution or construction of the object is a major challenge:
‘‘The character of a danger or threat that is predominant in a certain situation has
to be transformed into an object of inquiry in a way that makes the problem
deﬁnable and, thus, fosters the development of methods and means for resolving it’’
(Dewey 2001: 223). Unfortunately, this fundamental transformation (translation,
object constitution, or ‘‘problem transformation’’, cf. Becker and Jahn 2006: 314f) is
22 Similarities might be perceived between problem-oriented ID and Mode-II-science as described by
Gibbons et al. (1994).
23 ‘‘Internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ refer to the science system.
24 Therefore, in line with the terminology introduced by Gieryn (1983), problem-oriented interdisci-
plinarians always need to do a kind of a ‘‘boundary work’’: ‘‘demarcating science from non-science’’ as a
prerequisite for talking about ‘‘problem-oriented ID’’.
25 See above; this type was called object-oriented ID.
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26 In particular, philosophers of
language have remained silent although the translation procedures involved can be
regarded as major parts of philosophy of language. Criteria for a successful transfer
from one domain to another have not yet been developed. What happens on the way
from (a) societal problem perception, (b) extra-scientiﬁc problem constitution,
(c) scientiﬁc problem deﬁnition, (d) discipline-oriented problem decomposition, and
(e) the synthetic procedures of backward translation to the extra-scientiﬁc, societal
realm? This way is certainly not a mono-causal process, but rather an iterative one.
Egon Becker and Thomas Jahn employ the term ‘‘problem dynamics’’ to describe
the transfer between science and society as well as within the science system
(Becker and Jahn 2006: 310). Problems and their transfer turn out to be the central
issue in the methodology of ID. According to Christian Pohl and Gertrude Hirsch
Hadorn, ‘‘the core element of transdisciplinary research is the question of how
problems are to be identiﬁed, framed and structured within a broad area under
consideration’’ (Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn 2006: 40).
Problem-oriented ID, therefore, faces many methodological challenges—from
the framing of the problem at the very beginning to the various transfer and
translation procedures to the ﬁnal outcome. It should also be mentioned that
compared with standards of disciplinary sciences, this type of knowledge is exposed
to higher-quality standards, e.g., requirements of both society and scientiﬁc
community.
27
6 Epistemological clariﬁcation: beyond constructivism and realism
In addition to the formal and methodological issues of problems, their epistemo-
logical status is not clear at all. Two contrary positions are common, based on
different epistemological background convictions. According to a realist position,
problems are presupposed to exist in the ‘‘ontology’’ of the world, regardless of
human perception.
28 Constructivists, by contrast, assume that problems are
constituted or constructed (cf. Becker and Jahn 2006). Similarly, throughout the
1980s, the two different epistemological positions were very prominent in the
debate on risks: Ulrich Beck’s risk-realism vs. Niklas Luhmann’s risk-constructiv-
ism, fueled by different accusations: alarmism and relativism.
These traditional dichotomies are, however, futile. Rather, we should follow a
pragmatist’s approach and consider that (a) something really does exist and that this
situation is the source of our knowledge production. The hole in the ozone layer is
not a social or cognitive construction; the undesirable present state really does exist.
A minimal realism seems to be the best fundament to acknowledge the matter of
facts and to root the pragmatist position. (b) However, the reference or relation to
26 There are a few exceptions, e.g., the works conducted by the Europa ¨ische Akademie Bad Neuenahr-
Ahrweiler (Decker 2001) and the Institute for Social-Ecological Research (Becker and Jahn 2006: 313f).
27 That these are not always met is certainly problematic—but does not alter the dual responsibility—vis-
a `-vis science and vis-a `-vis society.
28 This position is upheld, for example, by the protagonists of ‘‘social ecology’’: ‘‘Rather, there is a thing
such as objective, societal problems’’ (Becker and Jahn 2006: 311).
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something as a ‘‘problem’’. Nuclear power plants alone, including nuclear waste, or
the hole in the ozone layer do not seem to be enough to identify a ‘‘problem’’. A
certain construction, including normative-based decisions, is indispensable to frame
an object or a situation as a problem: (i) The system construction encompasses the
demarcation decision about what the system is and what its environment is
(‘‘systems knowledge’’). For instance, should we consider the proliferation of
nuclear fuel and waste as part of the ‘‘nuclear power plant’’ system, or not? (ii) The
target construction refers to the goal setting procedures and desired future state
(‘‘target knowledge’’). (iii) The transformation-barrier (re-)construction involves
framing and analyzing the barriers and obstacles that hinder us from reaching the
desired future state—normativity is present within all types of (re-)constructions.
This is part of the position of methodological constructivism and of pragmatism.
Therefore, constructivism and realism converge in problem-oriented ID—this is
an epistemological position I tentatively call constructivist realism. Based on real
situations and matters of fact, problems are constituted according to normative
criteria. They can be considered as ascriptions induced by knowledge actions and
procedures of knowledge production. John Dewey underlines that ‘‘only the quality
of a certain [knowledge-] act shows that a doubtful situation can become a problem’’
(Dewey 2001: 223).
29 In that sense, problems are not presented but generated at the
science–society interface—admittedly with the necessity of a rational intersubjec-
tive justiﬁcation.
30 A kind of naı ¨ve problem realism, on the other hand, would
consider problems to be plain facts, accept them without questioning them, and
perceive them simply as a task to be tackled. What is typical for such a kind of naı ¨ve
problem realism is the presentation of case studies in some US-engineering ethics
text books (e.g., Harris et al. 2005). In extreme cases, the question of whether
execution in the electric chair is preferable to execution by lethal injection is
formulated as a problem. Fundamental questions about the death penalty and
execution conducted by a democratic state are not posed. Problem-oriented ID
rejects this kind of naı ¨ve problem realism. For each problem-oriented research
project, the central question at or before the beginning is as follows: what exactly is
the problem? Within the discourse, the problem constitution should be negotiable in
a rational argumentative manner with an explicit reﬂection on and revision of
normative relevance criteria and it should be justiﬁed in each case—while never
losing sight of its goals and purposes. Michael Decker explains that ‘‘the fact that
the point of reference for TA is constituted by extra-scientiﬁc problems, leads to
special requirements for the deﬁnition of the problem’’ (Decker 2010: 147).
The problem constitution is also interlaced with quality criteria in interdisci-
plinary projects, since, according to Armin Grunwald, it is true that ‘‘quality
properties of integrative research depend considerably on decisions of relevance
which must be made […] before beginning the research’’ (Grunwald 2004: 1). As of
29 ‘‘Indeed, a problem to be solved ‘‘technically’’ must ﬁrst be formed as a technical problem, or ‘‘made
technical’’. […] Such transformation can, for instance, ‘‘be achieved by way of omnipresent expert
knowledge’’ (Mittelstraß 1992: 34).
30 Bechmann and Frederichs claim that, ‘‘in deﬁning problems, politics is [constitutionally] dependent on
scientiﬁc knowledge’’ (Bechmann and Frederichs 1996: 14).
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considering its signiﬁcance for the design, process, and quality of a project.
7 Operational clariﬁcation: application of the four-type ID framework
7.1 Object-oriented interdisciplinarity in the Roco/Bainbridge report
of the US-NSF
The above-developed typology is not an end in itself. Rather, it offers an
orientation framework and some directions in the jungle of the hype of ID. Let
us look at one of the most prominent programs advocating the notion of ‘‘ID’’:
the Roco/Bainbridge report (2002), which has been a guideline and milestone in
the (interdisciplinary) science policy of nanotechnology. What type of ID is
intended and promoted by the Roco/Bainbridge report? The typology of the four
kinds of ID will help to classify and to assess ID (cf. Schmidt 2003, 2004,
2007a, 2010).
A coherent and consistent ID theory is not the goal of the Roco/Bainbridge report
and the convergence scenario of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information
technology, and cognitive science (NBIC scenario) (no theory-oriented ID). A
patchwork of models would work well if it provided a sufﬁcient and effective basis
for technological interventions. Theories are not regarded as ends in themselves:
rather, they are means and instruments. Theories are judged by the question of
whether they actually contribute to the development of new technologies—or not.
To put it brieﬂy: technology is the goal, not theory; technological intervention
instead of theoretical representation. On the other hand, the Roco/Bainbridge report
realizes that theoretical elements are indispensable; it is not averse to theory. The
patchwork of present-day engineering science limits progress. In order to promote
engineering science and to develop enabling technologies, we have to ‘‘integrate
what is happening’’ (Roco and Bainbridge 2002: 32). Because in many cases, we
realize that nothing is as practical as a good theory. In fact, theoretical orientation
for the sake of practical relevance makes the NBIC scenario an excellent example of
a ‘‘technoscience’’ (cf. Nordmann 2004). Natural sciences, engineering sciences,
and technology are merging. Because of its practical and pragmatic orientation,
however, the Roco/Bainbridge report pursues only a weak understanding of theory.
A theory is not understood in the sense of a deductive-nomological type of
explanation that is still the underlying objective of the uniﬁcation project of physics.
Thus, the report is hesitant and prefers to speak of the integration of knowledge,
models, and concepts rather than of a theory. Moreover, the core of the NBIC-
report—that is nanoscience—is not particularly successful in terms of theory
development and explanatory achievement. There is no framework theory for the
nanocosm. Quantum and classical regimes are still opposed to each other, even
though there is some progress in the area of mesoscale quantum systems. Certainly,
we ﬁnd progress regarding theories within the discipline of nanophysics. But the
progress in nanophysics can hardly be called ‘‘interdisciplinary’’ in the context of
theories.
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uniﬁed ID methodology are not the aim of the Roco/Bainbridge report (no method-
oriented ID). Methods are regarded as means and tools for obtaining knowledge.
What matters most are the efﬁciency and effectiveness of methods and not any
process of uniﬁcation. If uniﬁcation can help to increase efﬁciency, it is highly
desired. However, the methods we ﬁnd in the NBIC branch are based on
advancements in the realm of physics; some were developed in the areas of
chemistry and molecular biology. A physicist, Richard Feynman, gave the ﬁrst
programmatic speech on nanotechnology in 1959 (cf. Feynman 1959). He declared
that there seems to be ‘‘plenty of room at the bottom’’. The NBIC technologies are
mainly driven by methodological improvements in the area of physics. New
physical instruments such as the scanning tunneling microscope (STM) and the
atomic force microscope (AFM) are of major importance for the rise of
nanotechnology. They stem from advanced developments in physics in the early
1980s. If the core of the NBIC scenario is rooted in nanotechnology, then it is rooted
in physics. In fact, method-oriented disciplinarity is widely predominant.
Concrete problems are not in the focus (no problem-oriented ID). The NBIC
convergence can hardly be called problem oriented. It is mainly techno-object
oriented. Only very general and unspeciﬁc goals are formulated, such as human
enhancement and fulﬁlling the basic needs of the Least Developed Countries. The
term ‘‘new renaissance’’ seems to be nothing but a metaphor. The general goals are
devoid of content. In contrast, problem orientation means to deliberately set goals
and to reﬂect upon and revise purposes. Problem-oriented ID intends to focus on, to
frame, and to solve societal problems by explicitly reﬂecting on goals—and partly
by developing and making use of new technologies. The Roco/Bainbridge report
does not explicate or attempt to initiate a discourse about purposes. However, it
seems fascinated by technological development in itself, interlaced with the vague
notion of human enhancement: creating opportunities without orientation. For
instance, the Roco/Bainbridge report does not have broad reservations with regard
to military uses. An improvement of converging technologies for battleﬁeld
domination does not seem to be undesirable. Thus, the Roco/Bainbridge report does
not ﬁt into the reﬂexive concept of problem-oriented ID. In order to compensate for
the lack of purpose reﬂection and revision, concepts of technology assessment
address issues of converging technologies.
What can be said about interdisciplinary objects? Up to now my ﬁndings have
been negative—there is a lack of theory- and method-oriented ID and, if any, very
limited problem-oriented ID. What can be said about object-oriented ID? According
to my deﬁnition, we have to take two different kinds of object-oriented ID into
account. (a) The strong version assumes that objects are time invariantly located on
boundaries due to the universal layers of reality (universal object-oriented ID).
According to ontological realism, these objects were called interdisciplinary objects.
(b) A weaker version states that the boundaries have not always existed and do not
exist for ever (partial- or real-constructivistic object-oriented ID). Boundaries are
constructed by the way humans construct reality. Humans construct boundaries and
create objects on boundaries—in short: material boundary objects.
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nanotechnoobjects. They have not existed before and do not exist independently
in Nature or independent of humans, although they are based on the laws of Nature:
e.g., new materials, new products, and processes. According to the Roco/Bainbridge
report, nanoobjects form the fundamental basis for converging technologies.
The convergence occurs in objects, not in theories, methods, or problems. The
convergence of the four technologies is supposed to take place at the scale of the
nanotechnoobject: ‘‘Convergence of diverse technologies is based on material
unity at nanoscale and on technological integration from that scale. The building
blocks of matter are fundamental to all sciences’’. In the very small and real-
constructed world of the nanocosm, everything seems to converge. From this
perspective, the nanotechnoobjects can be labeled ‘‘interdisciplinary’’. It is
interesting to see how the real-constructed nanoobjects relate to physics. On the
one hand, nanotechnoobjects belong to the domain of physics; they are located on
boundaries between the quantum microcosm and the mesocosm. On the other
hand, the Roco/Bainbridge report aims to produce instrumental knowledge about
and for ‘‘enabling technologies’’, and not to obtain true objective knowledge, as in
‘‘old-fashioned’’ physics (Schmidt 2004). Although the boundaries between
physics and engineering sciences are highly disputed, it is worth stressing that
‘‘converging technologies’’ does not mean a convergence to objects belonging to
the discipline of physics but, rather, a convergence to technoscientiﬁc nanoob-
jects—which are objects for technological purposes. This is why we do not ﬁnd a
reduction to disciplinary objects such as objects of physics in the NBIC scenario,
but a reduction to interdisciplinary (real-constructed) objects. In this sense,
nanotechnoobjects are located between physics, chemistry, biology, and some
engineering sciences. Here, as Richard Feynman, the early protagonist of
nanotechnology, observed ‘‘there is plenty of room at the bottom’’ for non-
disciplinary nanoobjects (Feynman 1959).
In consequence, (real-constructivistic) technoobject-oriented ID turns out to
underlie the NBIC scenario. This type of ID is not a very strong one. Technoobjects
would appear to be at the core of the heterogeneous and diverse ﬁelds of the
umbrella term ‘‘nanotechnology’’, including electron-beam and ion-beam fabrica-
tion, molecular-beam epitaxy, nanoimprint lithography, projection electron micros-
copy, atom-by-atom manipulation, quantum-effect electronics, semiconductor
technology, spintronics, and micro-electromechanical systems. Constructed and
created interdisciplinary technoobjects are essential parts of the present-day reality
or the reality to come in the above ﬁelds (‘‘ontological’’ type). Technoobjects
populate our world.
7.2 In contrast: the Nordmann report and problem-oriented interdisciplinarity
The Roco/Bainbridge report with its object-oriented understanding of ID can be
contrasted with another prominent report. The Nordmann report is the answer to the
American initiative drawn up by a European Commission group of experts. The
Nordmann report—bearing the title ‘‘Converging Technologies: Shaping the Future
of European Societies’’—is a ‘‘speciﬁcally European approach to convergent
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31 Its core concept is called ‘‘CTEKS’’:
‘‘Converging Technologies for the European Knowledge Society’’. The European
group does not place its main focus on some sort of self-improvement of humankind
(‘‘human enhancement’’), but, more comprehensively, on societal innovation
processes. Its goal is to ‘‘expand the circles of convergences’’: It is not the
technologies themselves which are meant to converge but the goals of technology
development and research agendas (see below).
Not unlike the Roco/Bainbridge report, the Nordmann report aims at promoting
ID as an instrument for creating innovation: ‘‘strong interdisciplinarity for research.
[…] Research is needed about the processes of innovation and diffusion, the
economies of artiﬁcial environments, conditions for multidisciplinary, interdisci-
plinary, and transdisciplinary work’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004: 45/41).
32 The
Nordmann report is reﬂexive as long as ID is not considered as simply given or
easily produced. Rather, ID creates independent research questions: research about
ID as research for ID—and thus the condition of the possibility of innovation. But it
is not just the meta-issue of ID which distinguishes the Nordmann from the Roco/
Bainbridge report. It is also the understanding of ID which is different. The CTEKS
concept advocates problem-oriented ID. First of all, another convergence circle
must be chosen for this, comprising more than the four technology types described
in the Roco/Bainbridge report (‘‘NIBC technologies’’) as well as the associated
techno-sciences. The additional convergence circle of the Nordmann report refers
to: ‘‘nano-bio-cogno-socio-anthro-philo-geo-eco-urbo-orbo-macro–micro’’. For
this, the Nordmann report uses the term ‘‘converging technologies’’; thus, it does
not accept the narrow American deﬁnition of the term concerning limitations to
NBIC technologies.
But not just the convergence circle is wider and broader. Especially that which
converges is different: ‘‘Converging technologies converge toward a common goal
[or shared visions]’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004: 4). The Nordmann report advocates
convergence of (and in the) goal(s), while the Roco/Bainbridge report prefers a
convergence of (and in the) object(s). In the European CTEKS approach, the goals
31 The European Commission drew attention to CTs in the middle of the 2003 issue of the Foresighting
Europe newsletter. It featured a report about two NBIC conferences in the US that considered Converging
Technologies for the Improvement of Human Performance. The newsletter’s editorial continued: ‘‘In
order to deal with the questions developed in the US NBIC report, the Commission envisages the
establishment of a high level expert group on Converging Technologies’’.
32 ‘‘Interdisciplinarity should be strengthened, beyond planned or institutional collaboration, in program
calls and research policies from the Commission and from the European nations’’ (Nordmann 2004: 4).
Furthermore, ‘‘CT modules should be introduced at secondary and higher education levels to synergize
disciplinary perspectives and to foster interaction between liberal arts and the sciences’’ (ibid.: 5).
‘‘Commission and Member States need to recognize and support the contributions of the social sciences
and humanities in relation to CTs, with commitments especially to evolutionary anthropology, the
economics of technological research and development, foresight methodologies and philosophy’’ (ibid.,
5). And ‘‘A permanent societal observatory should be established for real-time monitoring and assessment
of international CT research, including CTEKS. […] that the Commission implement a ‘EuroSpecs’
research process for the development of European design speciﬁcations for converging technologies,
dealing with normative issues in preparation of an international ‘code of good conduct’ […]. The
integration of social research into CT development should be promoted through Begleitforschung
(‘accompanying research’ science and technology R&D)’’ (ibid.: 5).
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found and formulated. Problems, goals, and starting points must be determined.
Thus, the Nordmann report’s CTEKS approach ‘‘always [entails] an element of
agenda setting. Because of this, converging technologies are particularly open to
the deliberate inclusion of public and policy concerns. Deliberate agenda-setting
for CTs can therefore be used to advance strategic objectives such as the Lisbon
Agenda’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004: 4). The report uses the buzzword ‘‘converging
technologies’’ in the context of a future discourse, which aims to determine
research and development goals. Discursive, deliberative processes—connected
with key words such as participatory governance and technoscientiﬁc citizen-
ship—are favored; a proximity to discourse ethics becomes apparent. The
Nordmann report calls for an integration, not just of experts, but of citizens and
concerned parties into the process of agenda setting: ‘‘CTEKS agenda-setting is
not top down but integrated into the creative technology development process.
Beginning with scientiﬁc interest and technological expertise, it works from the
inside out in close collaboration with the social and human sciences and multiple
stakeholders through the proposed WiCCinitiative (‘Widening the Circles of
Convergence’). For the same reason, ethical and social considerations are not
external and purely reactive but through the proposed EuroSpecs process bring
awareness to CT research and development’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004:4 ) .T h e
normativity associated with that which appears on various levels—from problem
perceptions and deﬁnitions to the deﬁnition of purposes and the formulation of
goals—is made explicit by the CTEKS approach, as part of ID: ‘‘Normative
setting’’ is at the core of ‘‘interdisciplinary excellence’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004:
42). To achieve this, the following is valid: ‘‘CTEKS research programs require
and produce new standards for interdisciplinary research. Interdisciplinarity
usually means that researchers from various disciplines pool intellectual and
technical resources as they address a problem together. This form of interdis-
ciplinarity is insufﬁcient when the CTEKS agenda-setting process requires critical
and comparative assessments of the viability of proposals. Mutual criticism across
disciplinary boundaries is required […]. Funding incentives for collaborative
research is not enough to produce this kind of interdisciplinarity’’ (Nordmann
et al. 2004:4 6 ) .
Thus, the Nordmann report fervently advocates a type of ID which we called
problem-oriented ID in this paper.
33 Problems are at the center—they form the
starting point for research programs as well as projects. ‘‘It envisions that various
European converging technologies research programs will be formulated, each
addressing a different problem and each bringing together different technologies
and technology-enabling sciences’’ (Nordmann et al. 2004: 4). Thus, the Nordmann
report switches perspectives, away from an object-oriented ID, toward a problem-
oriented ID, aiming for a convergence of goals and a critical reﬂection on and
revision of purposes.
33 By widening the circles the CTEKS approach wishes to overcome what Segerstrale has severely
criticized: ‘‘the missing discourse about science and society’’ (Segerstrale 2000).
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If one takes what we have outlined above on problem-oriented ID as well as the
other three types of ID (Sect. 2) as a demarcating foil, then leading differences for
the speciﬁcation of this problem-oriented type of ID are as follows:
Problem orientation versus technology-induced approach (against object-
oriented ID): Problem-oriented ID not only refers to technology, but is much more
comprehensive. Ju ¨rgen Mittelstraß stresses: ‘‘While the technology-induced
approach ties in with technology types in a product-oriented way, in analysing
and assessing their consequences, the problem-oriented approach instead ties in with
existing and foreseeable problems and technology deﬁcits. However, different from
the technology-induced approach, the problem-oriented approach is not reactive; it
is not just about technology-induced problems’’ (Mittelstraß 1992: 26). From this,
criteria of anticipation have been deducted, along with earliness, upstream
engagement, as well as outcome orientation. Concerning the technology-induced
approach, Niklas Luhmann has critically remarked that in this instance ‘‘solutions to
problems are seeking problems which they have solved in order to ﬁnd their own
meaning’’ (Luhmann 1998: 794). We can, therefore, draw a clear line between
problem-oriented ID and the object-oriented ID that is most predominant in
engineering sciences.
Problem orientation versus a ﬁxation on theory, concepts, and fundamentals
(contrary to theory-oriented ID): Theories, concepts, and fundamentals may
serve as means—however, their achievement is not a goal. ‘‘Problem-oriented
research [must] be differentiated from fundamental research. [… it] focuses on
problems which occur in the societal realm, while fundamental research, whose
model is knowledge as an end in itself, does not answer to any other stimulant
than that of research itself’’ (Bechmann and Frederichs 1996:1 7 ) .‘ ‘ P r o b l e m -
oriented research cannot wait until the fundamentals of this area are clariﬁed in
order to then collect data and give advice based on well-established theories’’
(Bechmann and Frederichs 1996: 17). The traditional dichotomy of theory
versus practice appears in a modiﬁed manner. The connection with the project is
made explicitly in contrast to the connection to the (research) program. Thus,
there is a difference between problem orientation and focusing on basic research
and theory and, consequently, between problem-oriented ID and theory-oriented
ID.
Problem orientation versus method constraints (contrary to method-oriented ID):
This leading difference has been introduced to the debate on ID under the title
‘‘Problem orientation without method constraint’’ (Jaeger and Scheringer 1998).
Although methods may play a role in problem-oriented ID, for example in the
concept of Rationalist Technology Assessment, this is only from the perspective of
selecting means and adequate instruments. Anything goes—if it serves for the
solving of problems. Developing methods is not an orienting goal of problem-
oriented ID. However, the question of methodological foundation is highly disputed
throughout the discourse on ID. Efforts are being made on various levels to carry
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methods.
These three leading differences can be brought together in the above-discussed
leading difference between science and society.
34 The difference also becomes
evident when one keeps in mind that disciplinary science usually pursues (research)
programs, while problem-oriented ID conducts projects. In these projects, the
central task is not to solve but to clarify the problem and back-translate that which
makes a problem a problem: The scientiﬁcally generated problem knowledge can be
seen as a contribution to societal instructional knowledge. To speak of problem
orientation is, in a sense, more modest than to speak of solving a problem. Problem
orientation does not fall for the deceptive illusion that problems—once they have
become dominant—are terminally solvable.
35 Even Karl R. Popper has pointed out
a regress: ‘‘Every solution to a problem creates new unsolved problems’’ (Popper
2000: 42). Thus, Walther Rathenau was certainly right when he remarked: ‘‘The
invention of the problem is more important than the invention of the solution’’.
Erich Jantsch even intensiﬁes this idea: transdisciplinarity, he speculates, is ‘‘not for
problem-solving, but for a continuous process of profound self-renewal’’ (Jantsch
1972: 102). According to Jantsch, at the core of ID is not a conclusive solution but
rather an ever-present thorn in the ﬂesh of society.
Not everyone will consider all of the four types of ID described elsewhere as
relevant or acknowledge them as independent from each other. This is not
surprising. The preference for each notion of ID depends upon the respective basic
philosophical convictions. They determine which type is considered central and
which other types appear as consequences. With regard to well-established positions
in the philosophy, we may state in an oversimpliﬁcation: (a) Realists refer mainly to
given or constructed objects of a human-independent reality (‘‘ontological’’
dimension of ID). (b) Rationalists focus primarily on knowledge, theories, concepts,
propositions, and on issues of justiﬁcation of knowledge; positivists and some
realists, e.g., structural realists, share the same orientation toward theories
(epistemological dimension). (c) Methodological constructivists
36 and most prag-
matists reﬂect on methods, on actions, or on cognitive rules (methodological
dimension). (d) And instrumentalists, utilitarians, critical theorists and some
pragmatists refer to problems and problem perception, and how to handle and solve
problems pragmatically; the impact, effect, and outcome of knowledge are of utmost
relevance (problem-oriented dimension).
Hence, different philosophical positions determine (and give substance to) the
different meanings of ‘‘ID’’. Insofar as such philosophical positions do coexist, the
34 Because, according to Dewey, problems and ‘‘uncertainty are ﬁrst of all a practical matter’’ (Dewey
2001: 223).
35 According to Becker and Jahn it is ‘‘an illusionary yet prevalent view that implementing solutions
intended as answers to problems makes those problems disappear. Rather, in most cases one given
problem is transferred to another—hopefully better—condition, which itself, contains a (new) problem
core’’ (Becker and Jahn 2006: 312).
36 This well-known position in German speaking countries is not adequately recognized by the
international community of philosophy of science (cf. Janich 1992).
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one
37: The debates surrounding the philosophy also make this point clear; taking the
plurality of traditions in the philosophy of science into account, it is impossible to
eliminate the plurality of ‘‘ID’’ and achieve uniﬁcation toward one semantic core.
38
The objective of this paper was to elaborate on the vague notion of problem in
order to give some substance to a speciﬁc type of ID—namely to problem-oriented
ID. It was meant to show that the notion of the problem is central to the discourse
about ID. In view of this relevance in present-day science and research, the
‘‘problem’’ has, however, not received sufﬁcient attention and reﬂection: We have
problems with problems—with the reﬂection on and revision of the starting points
of concrete projects.
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